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Abstract  
 
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) business lending, where individual investors provide unsecured 
loans directly to individual business-borrowers without the intermediation of banks, has 
experienced rapid growth in recent years. However, very little is currently known about the 
individuals who lend money through the online P2P lending platforms. Drawing on the 
cognitive evaluation theory (CET) and responses to a survey from 630 investors of the Funding 
Circle platform, the largest P2P business-lending platform in the UK, this paper describes their 
personal characteristics, investment criteria and their motivation to invest. A typical P2P 
business lender is male, highly educated and relatively wealthy with a science, business or 
finance degree.  According to the factor analysis, variables related to company quality and 
associated risks are importance investment criteria while the expectation of making a financial 
return is the main motivation behind individuals’ decision to lend money to companies. In 
contrast, intrinsic motives such as geographical location, personal relationship or knowledge 
of the company, are of significantly less importance. 
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1. Introduction  
 
As banks retrench in the wake of the great financial crisis (GFC), small businesses and 
start-ups have found it increasingly hard to access the finance they need to grow (Pierrakis and 
Westlake, 2009; Baldock and North, 2015; Mac an Bhaird, 2013). New providers of business 
finance are stepping into the space left by banks and are devising innovative business models, 
often taking advantage of new technologies and different sources of capital. One such model 
that has grown rapidly in recent years is new form of crowdfunding, namely peer-to-peer 
financing via online intermediaries.  
 
The concept of crowdfunding finds its root in the broader concept of crowdsourcing, which 
uses the ‘crowd’ to obtain ideas, feedback and solutions in order to develop activities 
(Belleﬂamme et al., 2014).  In the case of crowdfunding, the objective is – also – to collect 
money from the crowd who can often participate in strategic decisions or even having voting 
rights (in the case of equity crowdfunding) in a business (Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010).  
While reward and donation based crowdfunding has quickly become popular due to Indiegogo 
in 2008 and Kickstarter in 2009 (Agrawal et al., 2014; Cumming et al., 2015; Belleﬂamme et 
al., 2014; Mollick, 2014), more recently, another form of crowdfunding, which enables the 
crowd to lend money to companies, has emerged. The term P2P lending has its origins in the 
facilitation of unsecured personal lending between individuals. A relatively new application of 
the P2P lending model allows the crowd (individual lenders) to lend money to companies 
(instead of individuals) seeking debt finance. Unlike traditional lending which is coordinated 
by a centralized institution (e.g. banks), online P2P lending is largely decentralized with 
individual lenders making lending decisions independently or as part of a network of lenders 
(Lin, 2009). The platform facilitating the funding serves as an intermediary between the 
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individual lender and the company seeking a loan. In most cases, the loan is an agreement 
between the borrower and the lender and not with the intermediary. 
 
 
Research on crowdfunding remains scattered and partial, mainly restrained by the limited 
access to the information, especially on the side of capital providers (Lin, 2009; Culkin et al., 
2016). Several researchers have studied the factors that lead to campaign success (Greenberg, 
2013; Mitra and Gilbert, 2014; Mollick, 2013), but very little work has been done on the 
individuals who participates in crowdfunding (Agrawal et al., 2011) and their motivations for 
participation (Gerber and Hui, 2016) especially for those seeking to invest in businesses 
(Bretschneider et al., 2014). This paper draws upon cognitive evaluation theory (CET) (Deci 
and Ryan, 1985) to assess how P2P lenders respond to both intrinsic and extrinsic cues 
embedded within investment opportunities. 
 
According to Gerber and Hui (2016) the key motivation for crowdfunding supporters 
includes to collect rewards, help others, be part of the community and support a cause. But 
these findings are mainly based on reward based crowdfunding. In equity based crowdfunding, 
key motivations for investors include potential financial return (Vismara, 2018) and fun 
(Bretschneider et al., 2014). We know very little about the motivations of P2P business lending 
investors as the P2P business lending model is largely undiscovered by academics. There is 
some emerging literature on P2P lending between individuals (Iyer et al., 2009; Lin and 
Viswanathan, 2015; Hildebrand et al., 2016) and on lending-based prosocial crowdfunding 
(Allison et al., 2015; Berns, 2018) but lending from people to commercial for profit businesses 
has received considerably less attention. Therefore, this paper attempts to fill this gap in our 
knowledge, by providing a detailed examination of lending-based crowdfunding choices, 
which involve small, non-accredited investors. This study provides first time evidence of 
investor motivations and their characteristics on one of the largest P2P platforms for business 
loans. It is an explanatory and descriptive analysis which investigates questions related to the 
personal and behavioural characteristics of individuals and their motivations for investing.  
 
More particularly, this research seeks to make a first step towards developing an 
understanding of P2P lending to businesses by using a large set of data collected through the 
Funding Circle, the largest P2P business lending site in the UK today. A distinguishing feature 
of this research is the focus on characteristics of the lenders and enables the examination of 
their investment criteria and their motivation to lend to small businesses. The data collected for 
this study included responses to a questionnaire from 630 different lenders who lent £4,143,000 
through 34,700 individual loans (transactions), members of the Funding Circle platform. The 
novelty of this study is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the only empirical study looking 
at investment criteria and motivation of lenders in P2P lending crowdfunding for commercial 
businesses.  
 
Therefore, the contribution of this research is twofold. First, it investigates the P2P lending 
model and provides insights on participant and investment characteristics. Second, it examines 
the investment criteria and motivations behind the decisions made by lenders. As a result, for 
the first time we are able to understand what type of investors use P2P business lending 
platforms and the main reasons behind their decisions to invest. Overall, the findings of this 
research contribute to our understanding of how lending based crowdfunding can be a viable 
source of business finance and how certain factors affect investor participation. By 
understanding the how and why people participate, we can identify opportunities to reﬁne and 
redesign crowdfunding platforms to improve the user experience and to better recruit and 
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sustain participation in this rapidly growing community (Gerber and Hui, 2013; Kraut and 
Resnick, 2012). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the academic 
literature related to P2P lending platforms and the motivation of individuals to invest. Section 
3 describes the research methodology and data sources while section 4 presents the results of 
the survey. Finally, section 5 discusses key findings and limitations of the study and provides 
questions for future research. 
 
 
 
2. Literature review  
 
Crowfunding 
 
Online crowdfunding, a relatively new form of financing for projects, people and 
businesses has recently received considerable attention by both academics and practitioners 
(Mollick, 2014; Belleﬂamme et al., 2014). The model, which allows many people to contribute 
small amounts in the hope of achieving a combined total that meets or surpasses a 
predetermined funding target, has its roots in the creative industries where it was successfully 
pioneered in the financing of albums and concerts (Gamble et al., 2017). Crowdfunding sites 
or ‘platforms’ sprung up that facilitated the sourcing of capital from large numbers of people 
for one–off projects. Schwienbacher and Larralde (2012) define crowdfunding as an open call, 
essentially through internet, for the provision of financial resource either in the form of 
donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights in order to support 
initiatives for specific purposes. However, such definition leaves out internet based P2P 
lending (Mollick, 2014, Lin and Viswanathan, 2015). A more inclusive definition is provided 
by Mollick (2014, p.2): ‘Crowdfunding refers to the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and 
groups – cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small 
contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the internet, without standard 
financial intermediaries.’ 
 
From its beginning funding music, the model expanded into the creative industries more 
broadly and into product design and development helped by the growth of large platforms such 
as Kickstarter and Indiegogo (Gerber and Hui, 2016). In recent years, the model has been 
adapted further to fund projects with a specifically social aim and also into the financing of 
businesses.  There are four key distinct models under the umbrella term of crowdfunding: (1) 
Donation-based crowdfunding, i.e. without any reward besides benevolence. (2) Reward-based 
crowdfunding, i.e. with non-financial rewards like products, services, promotion or others. (3) 
Lending-based crowdfunding, i.e. with financial returns like interest. (4) Equity-based 
crowdfunding, i.e. with financial returns such as equity, equity-like shares or dividends (Collins 
and Pierrakis, 2012; Griffin, 2012; Bretschneider, et al., 2014).    
 
 
Lending-based crowdfunding (P2P lending) 
 
While similar to crowdfunding, P2P lending is very distinct and this tool for providing 
loans is often considered separately from crowdfunding, although adopting the same business 
model (Herzenstein et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2013). The term P2P lending has its origins in the 
facilitation of unsecured personal lending between individuals (i.e. loans are made to an 
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individual rather than a company and borrowers do not provide collateral as a protection to the 
lender against default) via online sites such as Zopa, Lending Club and Prosper. There has been 
explosive growth in P2P personal lending across the world in the last decade, driven by the 
many–to–many communication paradigm, and various reports have looked at several aspects 
of this model such as the borrowers and lenders characteristics, motivations and strategies (Iyer 
et al., 2009). 
 
A relatively new application of the P2P lending model allows the crowd (individual 
lenders) to lend money to companies (instead of individuals) seeking debt finance. 
Crowdfunded lending to businesses has grown in recent years as an evolution of the more 
established model of P2P lending between individuals. Platforms give credit scores to 
businesses seeking loans and lenders can buy loan parts at an interest rate which is often 
adapted to the market demand. With the exception of pro-social lending, peer-to-peer lending 
is largely for profit but rests on uncollateralized loans (Bruton et al., 2015).  
 
The platform facilitating the funding serves as an intermediary between the individual 
lender and the company seeking a loan. P2P lending platforms all adopt all-or-nothing funding 
model, that is, the funds are returned to the funder unless the funding goal is reached (Gerber 
et al., 2012). There is an expectation of some rate of return on capital invested (Mollick, 2014). 
The increase in the quality and volume of data available on individuals and businesses finances 
allow for the creation of accurate credit scores, which allow lenders to set suitable interest rates 
on the finance they offer.  
 
Iyer et al., (2009) examine whether lenders participating in P2P lending platforms are 
able to effectively screen for borrower creditworthiness and thus improving small borrowers’ 
credit access, complementing and adding value to traditional lending models. Their findings 
highlight the screening ability of P2P lenders and suggest that the P2P lending market may 
provide a viable complement to traditional lending markets, especially for smaller borrowers. 
 
 
Funding Circle  
 
Funding Circle was founded in August 2010 and was the first company in the world to 
allow individuals to lend to companies.1 Businesses with a minimum of £100,000 turnover and 
two or more years of accounts filed with Companies House, can approach Funding Circle for 
the opportunity to borrow between £10,000 and £1m from its crowd of members. Currently 
there are more than 75,000 people registered and Funding Circle has facilitated over £3.8b of 
lending to 39,000 UK companies.2  Once a loan application meets Funding Circle’s criteria, it 
is reviewed by Funding Circle’s Credit Assessment team. Businesses that pass this stage are 
assigned a risk rating based on Funding Circle’s risk model that uses information from a 
number of sources including credit–rating agencies and is posted onto the site.   
 
Until August 2017, each loan request had its own dedicated page where potential 
lenders could see the financial details of the business and the reasons they are seeking finance. 
                                                     
1  Patrick Collinson (18 September 2010). "Peer-to-peer lending and saving: Making everyone happy". The 
Guardian. Retrieved 2-10-2018. 
2 Funding Circle website, accessed on 29 September 2018 
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Lenders were able to bid for small pieces or ‘loan parts’ of the overall amount being sought, 
indicating how much they would like to lend and what interest rate they would like to receive. 
Since September 2017 however, Funding Circle does no longer allow investors to select what 
loans they invest in and must instead cede this decision to an autobid system (by choosing a 
level of investment risk they are willing to accept).  Funding Circle charge fees to businesses 
ranging from 2–4 per cent depending on the loan amount. They also offer an asset– purchase 
option for a 5 per cent fee, using said asset as a guarantee. Lenders are charged an annual 
servicing fee of 1 per cent. Funding Circle also enables loan parts to be sold between lenders 
to provide liquidity. Participants can sell loan parts either for a premium or at a discount. 
 
Currently, Funding Circle has presence in the UK, US, Germany and the Netherlands 
and facilitates loans from institutional investors such as retail investors, banks, asset 
management companies, insurance companies, government-backed entities and funds. In 
September 2018 announced that it will seek to raise £300 million via an IPO and it current 
value is estimated at £1.65BN.3 
 
 
Other peer to peer platforms 
 
Funding circle is the largest but not the only player in the market for P2P business 
lending in the UK. Thincats operates as an investment club for experienced investors seeking 
to lend directly to UK businesses. Launched in 2011, it uses an auction model to decide on 
interest rates. Lenders, who are required to lend a minimum of £1,000 per loan, are not charged 
any fees with businesses charged 1.5 per cent of the loan amount. Thincats investors choose 
which loans they want to invest in themselves. To date Thincats has lent around £293 million 
across 941 loans.4 
 
 
Motivation of investors and investment criteria 
 
Knowledge on what motivates the crowd to invest in companies or projects is very 
limited and there are calls to investigate crowd’s motivation for crowdfunding (Lehner, 2013; 
Moritz and Block, 2016; McKenny et al., 2017). To investigate the interplay between ﬁnancial 
and nonﬁnancial incentives, we draw upon the cognitive evaluation theory (CET) (Deci et al., 
1999; Deci and Ryan, 1985). Deci and Ryan, (1985) distinguish between different types of 
motivation based on the different reasons or goals that give rise to an action. The most basic 
distinction is between intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something because it is 
inherently interesting or enjoyable, and extrinsic motivation, which refers to doing something 
because it leads to a separable outcome Deci and Ryan, (1985). Cognitive evaluation theory 
maintains that if individuals are given external incentives to perform a task they would have 
wanted to perform anyway, their intrinsic motivation to perform this task may decrease 
(Nyborg and Rege, 2003).  Allison et al. (2015) introduced CET in the context of micro-lending 
by showing that the narratives that entrepreneurs use can affect whether backers have a 
financial or a social focus when evaluating the loans. Cholakova and Clarysse (2015) extended 
the application of CET in the setting of crowdfunding and use it as a lens to explain investors’ 
motivations to back projects on reward-based and equity-based platforms. They found that the 
                                                     
3 Natasha Lomas, (2 September 2018):  “Funding Circle, a P2P SME lending platform, steps towards an IPO”. 
Crunchbase.com. Retrieved 2 October 2018 
4 Thincats.com website  accessed on 1st October 2018 
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decision to pledge to a project was positively predicted by individuals’ interest in receiving 
rewards, as well as by their need to trust the entrepreneur, whereas nonfinancial motives such 
as help others and support ideas or be a part of a community were not significant. However, 
the decision to invest in equity crowdfunding was positively predicted only by financial return 
motivations.  
 
At present, the popular assumption is that individuals on reward-based platforms are 
predominantly driven by intrinsic motivation to fund projects, whereas those on equity-based 
platforms are driven by extrinsic (ﬁnancial) motivation (Collins and Pierrakis, 2012; 
Cholakova and Clarysse, 2015). However, we still have limited understanding of the relative 
role of intrinsic and extrinsic motives in P2P business lending crowdfunding. Existing, albeit 
limited, literature from other forms of crowdfunding, mainly equity and reward crowdfunding 
and research on business angel investment criteria, indicate a few possible motivations for P2P 
lenders.  
 
Schwienbacher and Larralde (2012) suggest that innovative projects attract investors. 
Fun has also been identified as one a key motivation for crowdfunding (Bretschneider et al., 
2014) but also for business angel investing (Brettel, 2003). Another plausible explanation of 
why crowdfundees invest in a start-up is the obvious goal to obtain a financial profit on the 
invested capital (Bretschneider et al., 2014). In addition to the financial rewards, Bretschneider 
and Leimeister (2017) also emphasize the importance of various non-financial motives in 
equity crowdfunding such as receiving recognition from others, the ‘liking’ of specific projects 
and to influence the fruition of specific projects.  
 
Agrawal et al. (2011) found that family and friends are an important group for funding 
reward-based cowdfunding projects as crowdfundees tend to support projects to which they 
have an emotional relationship and familiar or friendship identification with the project 
initiators.  Regional identification is another intrinsic motive based on the proximity between 
the start-up and a crowdfundee. Lin and Viswanathan (2015) identified a home bias in the 
award of a loan. Mollick (2013) indicates that geographic effects in different ways can play an 
important role in the success of crowdfunding projects. In contrast, Agrawal et al. (2011) and 
Mollick (2013) found that the geographical distance as well as the location of a venture have 
none or little relevance for an investment.  
 
Drawing on insights of business angel research, the team, the market potential and the 
product have been identified as investment criteria and situational factors by various 
crowdfunding scholars. For example, Ahlers et al.  (2015) and Mollick (2013) found that the 
idea and the team are crucial positive signals for the investment decision and a successful 
funding of start-ups in crowdfunding. Guenther et al. (2015) argue that a higher degree of 
industry and financial expertise of equity crowdfunding investors positively affects the amount 
invested. Ahlers et al. (2015) examine start-ups signals that may have an influence on investor’s 
decisions to invest in equity crowdfunding and found that retaining equity and providing more 
detailed information about risks can be interpreted as effective signals and can therefore 
strongly impact the probability of investors to invest. Social capital and intellectual capital, by 
contrast, have little or no impact on funding success Ahlers et al. (2015). 
 
Burtch et al. (2013) identified crowd’s herding behaviour as a possible influencing factor 
for participation in crowdfunding. Banerjee (1992, p. 798) describes herding behavior as 
‘everyone doing what everyone else is doing, even when their private information suggests 
doing something quite different’. As a result, the decisions of other investors who have already 
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invested in a specific business are thus influenced by the behavior of others (Herzenstein et al., 
2011; Burtch et al., 2013).  Zhang and Liu (2012) found that investors infer the solvency of 
borrowers by observing decision of other investors, in the case of Prosper, a P2P consumer 
lending platform.  
 
 
 
3. Data and methodology  
 
Funding Circle included the survey invitation to its monthly newsletter on June 2012.5 
These individuals that received the survey had voluntarily registered on the Funding Circle 
marketplace. The questionnaire was also sent out via personalised emails to members6 by the 
Funding Circle team. At the time when the survey took place, there were approximately 40,000 
people registered as investors with Funding Circle. 
 
All participating investors have been exposed to the same market-related factors: there is 
only one type of financial product, same investment rules apply for every one and all 
participants have access to the same information. Therefore, it can be argued that differences 
in the observed investment choices stem exclusively from investor-related factors (Barasinska 
and Schäfer, 2014). The data collected for this study included responses to a survey from 630 
different lenders who lent £4,143,000 through 34,700 individual loans (transactions). The 
reliability of the survey instrument was deemed satisfactory since the Cronbach alphas 
coefficients were relatively high for the motivation items (the alpha coefficient for the 
motivation variables was 0.804). The survey was conducted in 2012, when investors could 
select individual loans, a feature which, as previously mentioned, is no longer available in the 
platform, and from this perspective, this dataset is unique as it provides insights on the Funding 
Circle investors’ motivation that may not be possible to capture any longer. 
 
The questions related on investors’ motives have been developed based on the findings of 
the literature examined in the previous section of this paper. The strengths of the motivation 
variables were measured using five-point Likert scale: 5 was ‘extremely important’, 4 was 
‘important’, 3 was ‘neutral’, 2 was ‘not very important’ and 1 was ‘unimportant’. Among 
others, the questionnaire included a question on gender identification and a question related to 
the total amounts of money invested in all assets by the survey participant. Therefore it was 
possible to test whether gender and level of wealth influence investors’ motivation.  The 
median value of the total wealth reported was used to create a variable that takes the value 1 if 
the investor reported a total wealth invested of £80k or over and the value 0 if the investor 
reported a total wealth invested of less than £80k.  
 
To determine whether the score given on one variable is significantly different from the 
score on another variable based on gender and level of wealth, the Wilcoxon rank sum test was 
used. The Wilcoxon rank sum test was used instead of t-test because the scores were not 
normally distributed and it provides a more powerful test of the differences between two 
population medians (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999). 
 
                                                     
5 The research project was a collaborative project between Nesta and Funding Circle led by the author of this 
paper 
6 At the time of the survey Funding Circle did not have any institutional investors, so all survey respondents 
were individual investors 
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The item by item analysis was followed by a factor analysis to determine whether 
motivations group together on significant factors. Principle component analysis (PCA) with an 
Equamax rotation was used to establish the factors, the factor loadings and communalities.  A 
summated scale was calculated for each factor to determine which factor had the greatest 
influence on investors. Each summative scale is an average of the Likert scores on the variables 
included in each particular factor. Finally, the Wilcoxon rank sum test was used to determine 
if one summative scale was significant different from another.  
 
 
4. Results  
 
Table 1: Sample characteristics of investors in FC 
 
Variable   Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Male  630 0.827 0.379 0 1 
Age  617 50.073 13.148 20 85 
SMEs experience  608 0.824 0.381 0 1 
Founding experience   581 0.470 0.500 0 1 
Experience in accessing external capital 620 0.295 0.456 0 1 
Business Angels  623 0.088 0.284 0 1 
Investments in shares and 
bonds  627 0.879 0.327 0 1 
Has lent money outside FC  639 0.319 0.466 0 1 
       
Total amount invested in FC  565 7,333 16,294 0 135000 
Average per loan  501 157.467 608.697 10 12500 
Proportion of wealth  560 8.958 16.959 0 100 
Total capital invested in all assets 498 339,504 2358262 100 50m 
Time spent for DD 514 11.836 13.904 0 80 
Use of Q&A 564 0.238 0.424 0 1 
Use of the autobid function 561 0.45 0.497 0 1 
Proportion of money invested using 
autobid 561 32.49 43.58 0 100 
       
Level of education  Freq. Percent  Region  Freq. Percent 
       
Secondary level 86 13.63  East Midlands 40 6.32 
Graduate degree or professional 
qualification  317 50.24  East of England 35 5.53 
Postgraduate qualification 155 24.56  London 138 21.8 
MBA 34 5.39  North East England 19 3 
PhD 39 6.18  North West England 61 9.64 
Discipline  Freq. Percent  Northern Ireland 7 1.11 
Computer science 50 8.85  Scotland 34 5.37 
Economics 20 3.54  South East England 137 21.64 
Finance 61 10.8  South West England 79 12.48 
9 
 
Math 22 3.89  Wales 16 2.53 
Science (e.g. engineering) 186 32.92  West Midlands 35 5.53 
Social science (e.g. business) 226 40  
Yorkshire and the 
Humber 32 5.06 
 
 
 
 
Demographic characteristics  
 
The average lender in the surveyed sample was around 50 years old, while 83 percent 
of all lenders that took part in the survey were males. 82 percent have experience working with 
SMEs while 47 percent have established one or more companies in the past. Six per cent of the 
lenders surveyed have a PhD and 5 percent have an MBA degree. One quarter of lenders have 
another form of postgraduate qualification and around have of them hold a professional 
qualification or a graduate degree. Looking at the field of qualification, social science (e.g. 
business and management) and science (e.g. engineering) were the most common responses. 
21.8 percent of the respondents are located in London and 21.64 percent in South East England. 
 
 
Investment background  
 
29.5 percent of surveyed lenders have some experience in accessing external capital 
while 8.8 percent identified themselves as Business Angels. 87.9 percent of them have invested 
in bonds or shares, while 31.9 percent have lent money to companies outside FC. 
 
 
Investment behavior  
 
Table 1 shows that the respondents of the survey have lent on average £7,333 to 
businesses. However, there is large heterogeneity between individual lenders which is evident 
from the median values. The median amount of money that individuals lent was £2,000. 
 
The total amount of capital that individuals have on average invested through funding circle as 
a proportion of their total financial wealth (savings and investment) is 8.96 percent, which 
similar to business angels who tend to invest around 10 per cent of their wealth into ventures 
(Wiltbank, 2009). The total amount of savings and investment of the average lender is £340,000 
(and the median £80,000).  The average time that a lender spends doing research on an 
individual business before bidding is 15 minutes.  Only one–quarter of the surveyed lenders 
have used the Q&A facility. Interestingly, 45 percent of the investors used the autobid function7 
and on average they invested 32.49 percent of their overall investment through this function.  
 
 
Investment criteria and investors’ motivation  
                                                     
7 The lender sets the average interest rate they require, the level of diversification they want and the risk 
bands the loans they are willing to fund must be in. The autobid tool then bids on loan parts that meet these 
criteria and add successful bids to the lenders portfolio. The benefit of this is that those looking to lend to a 
large number of businesses can do so without having to go through them one–by–one. 
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Survey respondents were asked to rate 8 variables related to investment criteria and 5 
variables related to investment motivation identified in the literature, on a five-point Likert 
scale: five (5) being ‘extremely important’ to 1 being ‘unimportant’. 
 
Table 2: Mean score for investment criteria and motivation of peer-to-peer investors  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Investment criteria       
Great product 557 3.438 0.961 1 5 
Business model 556 3.531 0.934 1 5 
Management team 554 3.374 1.004 1 5 
Customer and market potential  554 3.440 0.979 1 5 
Risk rating  557 4.070 0.869 1 5 
Popularity with other lenders 556 2.874 1.018 1 5 
Financial track record 557 3.989 0.848 1 5 
Personal expertise in the industry  556 2.689 1.068 1 5 
Motivation to lend      
Interest offered 563 4.384 0.671 1 5 
Security  558 4.186 0.756 1 5 
Personal knowledge of the company  553 2.134 1.050 1 5 
Family relationship or friendship 554 1.735 0.964 1 5 
Region in which the company is based 553 2.119 1.115 1 5 
Note: 5= extremely important; 4= important; 3=neutral; 2= not so important; 1= unimportant.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the results of the survey responses to the question on ‘how different 
factors influence your decision to lend money’. The risk rating given by the Funding Circle, is 
ranked top within the investment criteria by the survey respondents (4.07). Relatively highly 
ranked is also the variable on financial track record of the company (3.98). The company 
characteristics associated with the product or service offered by the company, its business 
model, the management team and the customer and market potential received average scores 
of 3.43, 3.53, 3.37 and 3.44 respectively by the surveyed lenders.  The variables related to the 
popularity of the company amongst other lenders and personal expertise of the industry 
received relatively lower scores (2.87 and 2.68 respectively).   
 
The average score for the variable interest rate offered is 4.38, the highest average score 
among motivation rated variables. The second most popular motivation variable for lenders, 
was the security offered (4.18). The variables associated with intrinsic motivations such as 
personal knowledge of the company, family relationship or friendship and region in which the 
company is based, have received the lowest average scores by the survey respondents with 
2.13, 1.73 and 2.11  respectively. 
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Table 3: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test  
 
 Gender (f-m)   Wealth (p-r) 
 Z p value  Z p value 
Investment criteria       
Great product 1.991 0.046  0.44 0.658 
Business model -0.27 0.784  0.816 0.414 
Management team -1.367 0.17  -0.539 0.59 
Customer and market potential  0.88 0.3856  -0.209 0.834 
Risk rating  0.634 0.523  0.841 0.401 
Popularity with other lenders 0.991 0.319  2.877 0.004 
Financial track record 0.031 0.97  0.511 0.606 
Personal expertise in the industry  -0.278 0.774  1.625 0.104 
Motivation to lend      
Interest offered -1.652 0.098  -0.574 0.566 
Security  1.345 0.166  1.376 0.168 
Personal knowledge of the company  0.856 0.395  0.367 0.714 
Family relationship or friendship 2.144 0.032  -0.48 0.631 
Region in which the company is based 2.749 0.006   -0.23 0.81 
 
Table 3 suggests that females are less motivated by the interest rated offered but more 
motivated by the product quality compared with males, indicating that they are more risk averse 
compared with male investors. This is in line with Mohammadi and Shafi (2018) findings in 
the case of equity crowdfunding.  
 
In addition, female lender seems to exhibit higher level of intrinsic motivation as they 
regard family and region as more important motives compared with male investors (although 
their relatives and friends are likely to be based in the same region). Interestingly, herding 
seems to be important only for lenders with less than £80k invested.  
 
 
 
Table 4A: Principal component factor analysis for investment criteria variables  
 
  Investment criteria variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness  
1 Great product 0.721 0.211 0.436 
2 Business model 0.799 0.287 0.280 
3 Management team 0.767 0.303 0.320 
4 Customer and market potential  0.739 0.368 0.319 
5 Risk rating  -0.199 0.775 0.360 
6 Popularity with other lenders 0.014 0.689 0.525 
7 Financial track record 0.406 0.574 0.506 
8 Personal expertise in the industry  0.497 0.377 0.611 
          
 Variance  2.743 1.899  
 Percentage of variance 0.343 0.237  
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 Number of observations: 541    
 
 
Table 4B: Principal component factor analysis for motivation variables  
 
  Motivation variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness  
1 Interest offered -0.129 0.741 0.435 
2 Security  0.146 0.754 0.410 
3 Personal knowledge of the company  0.871 0.070 0.236 
4 Family relationship or friendship 0.881 0.025 0.224 
5 Region in which the company is based 0.752 -0.186 0.400 
          
 Variance  2.138 1.157  
 Percentage of variance 0.427 0.231  
 Number of observations: 544    
 
 
Figure 1A: Factor loadings, investment criteria  
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Figure 2A: Factor loading, motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 4A and 4B and Figures 1A and 2A present the results of the factor analysis. The 
best fit factor analysis accounts for 61.1 percent and 66 percent of variance for the investment 
criteria and investors’ motivation respectively and was obtained by using Principle Component 
Factor (PCF) analysis with an orthogonal Equamax rotation. As shown in Table 4A, a factor 
analysis of the investors’ criteria led to two factors.  The first factor is referred to as a “company 
quality factor” and contains motives 1 to 4. These variables include product quality, business 
model, management team and customer and market potential and explain 43.3 percent of the 
variability. The second factor is referred to as a ‘risk factor’ and consists of motives risk rating, 
popularity with other lenders and financial track record. This factor accounts for 23.7 percent 
of the variability.  
 
Table A2 presents the results of factor analysis of the investors’ motivation related 
variables and it has led to two factors. The first factor is referred to as an ‘intrinsic factor’ and 
consists of motives 3, 4 and 5, which are personal knowledge of the company, family 
relationship or friendship and region in which the company is based. This factor accounts for 
42.7 percent of the variability. The second factor is referred to as a ‘financial profit factor’ and 
consists of motive 1 and 2 which are interest offered and security. This factor accounts for 23.1 
percent of the variability.  
 
Table 5: Mean score of investors by factors 
 
 Total Male Female 
Investment criteria factors Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Scale 1 - Factor 1: Company quality factor 3.445 0.064 3.436 0.066 3.473 0.160 
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Scale 2 - Factor 2: Risk factor 3.644 0.668 3.634 0.680 3.682 0.634 
       
Motivation to lend factors           
Scale 1 - Factor 1: Intrinsic factor 1.996 0.226 1.952 0.230 2.189 0.234 
Scale 2 - Factor 2: Financial profit factor 4.285 0.14 4.285 0.157 4.275 0.024 
 
 
Factor 1 (company quality factor) has the highest explanatory value (34.3 percent) 
among the investment criteria factors, but factor 2 (risk factor) is the most important investment 
criteria (mean score 3.644) according to summated scale scores shown in Table 5. Similarly, 
although factor 1 (intrinsic factor) has the highest explanatory value (42.7 percent) among 
motivational factors, that does not mean that factor 1 is the most important motivation for 
investors. According to summated scale scores, the highest mean score (4.285) was for factor 
2 (financial profit). This indicates that investors are most motivated by financial return rather 
than intrinsic factors.  
 
Although the Wilcoxon rank sum test in Table 3 shows that female investors are more 
motivated by intrinsic motives than male investors, Table 5 suggests, that overall, the ranking 
of the motivation variables does not differ between male and female investors.   
 
Robustness checks  
 
As a robustness check, the factor analysis was repeated for two restricted samples. The first 
sample included only lenders that used the autobid function (see Table A1.A). The second 
sample included only lenders that invested over 70 percent of their money using the autobid 
function (see Table A1.B). In both cases the results were very similar to the factor analysis 
based on the original sample, implying that there should not be significant differences between 
the investors that used the autobid function (passive investors) and those that did not.   
 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In general, it appears that P2P business lenders are sophisticated individuals, highly–
educated with investments in other assets. Limited data currently available on the 
characteristics of participants in other forms of crowdfunding suggests that reward or donation 
crowdfunders (those donating or seeking a non–financial return from their contributions) are 
from more varied backgrounds and are unlikely to have as much financial or investment 
experience (Pierrakis and Collins, 2013). In contrast, P2P lenders seem to share several 
personal characteristics with business angels in terms of background and wealth invested (see 
for example Wiltbank, 2009).  
 
The actual goals of crowdfunding funders or investors are extremely heterogeneous and 
motivations may be complex for different approaches to crowdfunding (Mollick, 2014). In 
many cases non–financial motivation is the main driver of an individual’s decision to fund a 
project or business. This can be due to a number of factors, for example the project may be 
delivering a social benefit that the funder wishes to support, the project may be developing a 
product that is of interest or the entrepreneur themselves may be in some way connected to the 
funder. In their study on investors in crowdfunded projects Ordanini et al. (2011) conclude that 
there are three main factors that can be seen as the motivating factors for investors: A feeling 
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of being at least partly responsible for the success of others’ initiatives (desire for patronage); 
striving to be part of a communal social initiative (desire for social participation); seeking a 
payoff from monetary contributions (desire for investment). Within a traditional investment 
context, the quality of the company or project would be an additional investment criterion and 
motive (Spence, 1978).  In the case of P2P business-lending, the weight of these different 
motives to the lenders’ investment decision varies significantly.  
 
First, in the case of crowdfunding it is not obvious that quality need be an important 
determinant in funding (Mollick, 2014) and project quality may not be as clear or as influential 
to funders in crowdfunding settings compared with more traditional investments (Bogost, 
2012). Indeed, our research shows that in the case of P2P lending to businesses the quality of 
the business (‘company quality factor’, mean 3.445) is important to investors but to a much 
lesser extent compared with the financial return (‘financial return factor’, mean 4.285).   
 
Second, Iyer et al. (2009) suggests that the P2P markets may have participants who are 
skilled at judging particular aspects of the borrower that banks are unable to gauge, for 
example, a lender who works in the sector where the borrower proposes an entrepreneurial 
business idea may better assess the viability of the proposal. However, our research results 
show that personal expertise in the industry is relatively a less important factor in the decision 
of the investors to lend money to a business (mean score: 2.66, Table 1).  
 
Third, in the case of reward crowdfunding, Mollick (2014) found that personal networks 
and geography is related to both the type of projects proposed and successful fundraising. Van 
Wingerden and Ryan (2011) suggest that individuals engage in the activity of crowdfunding 
for intrinsic reasons, mimicking a relationship also existing in the neighboring fields of 
crowdsourcing. While in many cases, non–financial motives are the main drivers behind 
people’s decision to invest or donate money, our research shows that P2P business lending 
significantly differs from other forms of crowdfunding and intrinsic motivations such as 
‘region in which the company is based’, ‘personal knowledge of the company’ and ‘family 
relationship’ are by and large of very low relevance to the vast majority of the P2P business 
lenders. 
 
Overall, the relatively low ranking of intrinsic motivations and provided by P2P business-
lending providers,  indicate that they mainly base their decision to invest on financial 
investment criteria as the financial return factor is ranked most prominently. This observation 
is also supported by the fact that the average time that a lender spends doing research on an 
individual business before bidding is 15 minutes and only 1 in 4 uses the Q&A facility to 
communicate with the borrower (see Table 1).  
 
The implication of this finding is that within the P2P lending model investors do not 
significantly contribute to the due diligence and validation process of the investment 
opportunity. Instead, they mainly rely on the actual investment risk assigned by Funding Circle 
and the associated interest offered. This is perhaps the reason behind Funding Circle’s decision 
in September 2017 to stop allowing individual investors to select in which company they will 
invest but instead they can now only select a range of interest rate bands within which their 
investment will be allocated. This practically mean that P2P lending to businesses is often a 
silent or passive investment process and may be inefficient in mobilizing the ‘wisdom of the 
crowd’ to select appropriate businesses to back. The investment decision is essentially left to 
the managers of the P2P platform and the associated investment risk they assign to each 
business. From a cognitive evaluation theory perspective, lenders that are given extrinsic 
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incentives to perform a task (investment) they would have wanted to perform anyway, their 
intrinsic motivation to perform this task decreases.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Overall, our research shows that both the characteristics of P2P business-lending investors 
and their motivations are different to those operating in other forms of crowdfunding.  In 
essence, it seems that the P2P lending to business industry has become more ‘professionalized’ 
compared with other types of crowdfunding industry. Investors simply invest their money in a 
similar way they often invest in bonds (i.e. select a risk band range acceptable to them) and 
fully trust the risk assessment of investment professionals.  On one hand, perhaps this is one of 
the main reasons that P2P is growing at a higher speed than other types of crowdfunding and 
facilitates over three times more investments than the equity crowdfunding which is the second 
most popular type of business crowdfunding in the UK (Zhang et al., 2016). On the other hand, 
it appears that P2P lending to businesses gradually moves away from the principles of what is 
currently considered as ‘crowdfunding’ supporting previous observations of Herzenstein et al 
(2011) and Lin et al. (2013) that although it uses the same business model, P2P lending to 
businesses is a very distinct financial tool and it should be considered separately from 
crowfunding. 
 
6.1 Limitations and future research questions 
 
A potential limitation of this research is that the survey was conducted in 2012, when the 
concept of P2P lending was still at its infancy stage. However, there are no reasons to believe 
that the motivations of the lenders to join a P2P platform have changed since 2012, and 
financial returns is still the key motive of individuals to lend money through the Funding Circle. 
There are two factors contributing to this belief. First, the modus operandi of Funding Circle 
has changed and loans are now automatically allocated to borrowers, based on risk bands of 
investment selected by lenders. The continuous increase in the number of investors lending 
through Funding Circle implies that their key motivation remains a financial return. Second, 
during the survey, individuals were asked to indicate whether they use the autobid function 
(when Funding Circle automatically allocates loans to lenders) and 45 percent of them 
responded they did (Table 1). As a robustness check, the factor analysis was repeated with the 
inclusion of only lenders that used the autobid function and the results were very similar to the 
lenders that did not use such function, implying that there should not be significant differences 
between the responders of 2012 with current users of the platform.  
 
A further limitation of this research is that the survey did not capture data at the loan level 
but at the lenders’ aggregated level. Therefore it was not possible to perform analysis based on 
individual loans as the unit of analysis (for example, how likely it is that Funding Circle loans 
provide lenders with supernormal profits which would have required information on the 
maturity of each loan, when they were issued, the coupon, and whether they’ve defaulted).  
Because crowdfunding can take several forms, an understanding of the investor's motivation 
to invest in different forms of crowdfunding is important, especially when considering the rapid 
expansion of crowdfunding initiatives in recent years. Future research should seek to further 
explore differences between personal characteristics and investment motivation between the 
different types of crowdfunding investors. Do these factors differ among cultures and 
countries?  To what extent investors’ characteristics and investment motivation predict the 
likelihood of a campaign to be funded?  Iyer et al. (2009) found that multiple lenders can 
collectively infer borrowers’ underlying creditworthiness by exploiting the potentially rich 
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information setting that peer-to-peer lending websites allow. However, Funding Circle does no 
longer allow lenders to decide in which company to invest. A future research could investigate 
whether letting the crowd to decide where to invest results in better or worse financial return 
compared to when the platform managers make such investment decisions. Finally, research 
on the relationship between (i) the type of compensation offered by the campaign and the extent 
to which such compensation influences individuals’ decision to invest, and (ii) the type of 
motivation (extrinsic and intrinsic) and the likelihood of the investor to adapt a passive 
investment role, would further our knowledge on investment motivation in this rapidly growing 
industry.  
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Appendices 
 
Table A1.A: Principal component factor analysis for investment criteria variables for 
investors using the autobid function  
 
  Investment criteria variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness  
1 Great product 0.745 0.279 0.368 
2 Business model 0.776 0.382 0.253 
3 Management team 0.736 0.423 0.280 
4 Customer and market potential  0.763 0.369 0.282 
5 Risk rating  -0.282 0.796 0.287 
6 Popularity with other lenders 0.089 0.634 0.590 
7 Financial track record 0.413 0.631 0.431 
8 Personal expertise in the industry  0.587 0.296 0.568 
          
 Variance  2.881 2.060  
 Percentage of variance 0.360 0.257  
 Number of observations: 236    
 
 
Table A2.B: Principal component factor analysis for motivation variables for investors using 
the autobid function  
 
  Motivation variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness  
1 Interest offered -0.082 0.794 0.362 
2 Security  0.064 0.797 0.361 
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3 Personal knowledge of the company  0.859 0.012 0.262 
4 Family relationship or friendship 0.895 -0.014 0.200 
5 Region in which the company is based 0.838 -0.080 0.292 
          
 Variance  2.250 1.272  
 Percentage of variance 0.450 0.254  
 Number of observations: 236    
 
 
Table A2.A: Principal component factor analysis for investment criteria variables for 
investors lending over 70 percent of their money using the autobid function 
 
  Investment criteria variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness  
1 Great product 0.724 0.369 0.339 
2 Business model 0.782 0.388 0.239 
3 Management team 0.778 0.382 0.249 
4 Customer and market potential  0.799 0.281 0.282 
5 Risk rating  -0.269 0.814 0.265 
6 Popularity with other lenders 0.056 0.678 0.537 
7 Financial track record 0.475 0.649 0.354 
8 Personal expertise in the industry  0.580 0.332 0.553 
          
 Variance  3.016 2.165  
 Percentage of variance 0.377 0.277  
 Number of observations: 165    
 
 
Table A2.B: Principal component factor analysis for motivation variables for investors 
lending over 70 percent of their money using the autobid function 
 
  Motivation variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness  
1 Interest offered -0.042 0.806 0.348 
2 Security  0.055 0.804 0.351 
3 Personal knowledge of the company  0.851 0.026 0.274 
4 Family relationship or friendship 0.881 0.005 0.224 
5 Region in which the company is based 0.874 0.021 0.236 
          
 Variance  2.269 1.296  
 Percentage of variance 0.453 0.259  
 Number of observations: 165    
 
